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Abstract 
We address the commentaries of Robey and Mikhaeil, of Mingers, and of Schultze which 
provided responses to our paper, “Crafting theory to satisfy the requirements of systems 
science.”  We find their responses useful for reflecting on the development of the role of 
systems theorising within information systems research and provide our reaction in order 
to clarify several fundamental considerations pertaining to 1) our proposed set of 
requirements for systems theorizing, 2) the need for explicit systems theorizing, 3) the 
supposed overall neglect of systems science, 4) the communicability of systems theory and the 
path of grand theories, 5) emergence, the observer, and other considerations, and 6) systems 
theory from the perspective of sociomateriality. 
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Introduction 
In our essay (Demetis & Lee, 2016), we deliberately presented just one possible set of 
requirements for systems science to satisfy. Our purpose was for the essay to open up a 
discussion on the role of systems theory in Information Systems (IS) research. Based on three 
reactions to our essay (Mingers, 2017; Robey & Mikhaeil, 2016; Schultze, 2017), we are 
pleased that it has “struck a nerve.” This is exactly the sort of response that we feel is needed 
for the overall field of IS to take systems theory seriously for the first time. And, as in 
undertaking any journey, it is necessary for the field to begin by taking the first step. 
We address the commentary of Robey and Mikhaeil and the commentary of Mingers in the 
first part of this response, and the commentary of Schultze in the second part.  We address the 
following points: 1) our proposed set of requirements for systems theorizing, 2) the need for 
explicit systems theorizing, 3) the supposed overall neglect of systems science, 4) the 
communicability of systems theory and the path of grand theories, 5) emergence, the 
observer, and other considerations, and 6) systems theory from the perspective of 
sociomateriality. 
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1. On our proposed set of requirements for systems theorizing 
In our essay (Demetis & Lee, 2016), we proposed a set of requirements for a systems theory 
to satisfy.  In order to emphasize the context of their development, we would like to highlight 
the following direct quotations from our essay: 
 
The purpose is not to present all features of systems science… (p.116) 
Based on our preceding discussion of some basics of systems science in general and 
Luhmann's systems theory in particular, we offer the following as a set of 
requirements for a theory to satisfy in order to be considered a systems theory. Given 
the extensive diversity of systems approaches, the requirements we offer make up but 
one possible set, where the set is sufficient to be illustrative of systems theorizing. 
(p.121) 
 
We emphasize that what we provide in this paper is not a universal set of systems 
criteria but just one possible set out of many. (p.126) 
 
All three commentaries argue from a standpoint as if we present our six requirements as the 
only set of requirements for systems theorizing.  For instance, Mingers (2017) says, “The first 
problem is that the field of systems is so broad as to defy any sort of succinct definition or 
description as this paper attempts” (p.67) and “The second problem is that even this area is 
dealt with in a rather cursory manner. In terms of any detail, it covers only a single theorist – 
Niklas Luhmann” (p. 67) where Mingers characterizes Luhmann as “rather marginal, highly 
abstract and complex, and not really a representative of GST” (p. 67), ignores our distinction 
between GST/LST (and second order cybernetics), and underplays Luhmann’s contribution.1 
Worth noting is that King and Thornhill (2003) offer their own detailed analysis of how 
Mingers’ view on Luhmann is “misleading in certain key aspects… [and] involves a 
misunderstanding of Luhmann’s sociology and a failure to appreciate the overriding objective 
that Luhmann set himself in his theoretical work” (2003, p. 276) 
Minger’s “partial history of systems thinking” is useful; yet, the tomes of past work on 
systems thinking and systems theory that Mingers brings up have largely been collecting dust 
as far as the information systems discipline is concerned.  The mere existence of knowledge 
(here, knowledge about systems) is no guarantee in itself that the knowledge will be 
used.  Knowledge does not implement itself.  Simply pointing to the existence of vast tomes 
of past, dormant research is a futile effort.  How to resurrect them — or rather, in the 
                                                     
1 GST is general systems theory.  LST is Luhmannian systems theory. 
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information systems discipline, to bring them to life in the first place and attempt to 
implement even a few principles in an application domain is the point that our essay 
addressed.   
 
Mingers also offers his own set of criteria for what constitutes systems theorizing and we 
welcome yet additional criteria from other scholars, so as to more fully illustrate the many 
different facets of systems thinking. This gives us the opportunity to mention (as we do use 
concepts from GST and LST) that we are not calling for a GST-only application of systems 
concepts to IS. Our addition of requirements from LST is one way (out of many) for 
emphasizing some core developments in systems theory. We find Robey and Mikhaeil’s 
perspective on this as particularly fruitful when they mention that “Hopefully, interest in 
older systems theory, while looking backward, can also serve as a springboard for fresh ideas 
that engage directly with contemporary technologies and society” (p. 130). 
 
2. The need for explicit systems theorizing 
 
Our position, which is that it is necessary to begin a journey by taking the first step, directly 
contradicts the protestations framed as “déjà vu” by Robey and Mikhaeil and “back to the 
future” by Mingers, whose phrasings presume that the journey had begun long ago. Instead, 
the reality is that the field of information systems as a whole has never seriously entertained 
systems theory in the first place. We have noted a few individual exceptions like Checkland 
(2000) and Alter (2001), but there has existed no overall body of literature indicating a 
systems movement in the field of information systems to which they or others have 
contributed.  
 
An indicative example of how Robey and Mikhaeil perceive the role of systems theory is 
evident in the following passage (2016, pp. 128-129).  
 
Despite overall neglect of systems science, GST [General Systems Theory] concepts 
crept into organization studies and IS and remain there. For examples, theoretical 
approaches drawing from socio-technical systems and sociomateriality (Leonardi, 
2013), structuration theory (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991), and complexity theory 
(Braa, Hanseth, Heywood, Mohammed, & Shaw, 2007) all engage with social 
systems. Indeed, systems thinking is deeply imbedded in IS design and methodology, 
which in turn shapes the way we conceive of organizations. We might argue, 
therefore, that many of the key insights from general systems thinking have become 
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part of the IS lexicon. While the links back to GST as a source for these ideas may be 
neglected, IS remains enriched due to its adoption and absorption of many of the 
tenets that Demetis and Lee offer….In summary, GST did not simply fall out of favor 
out of mindless neglect. Systems science is already deeply imbued in IS thinking and 
research.  
 
If indeed systems science is “deeply imbued” in IS thinking and research then it is so deeply 
imbued as to be unrecognizable and undetectable.  One would be at pains to reconstruct any 
set of requirements for systems theorizing from existing IS research. The point that we are 
making is not for systems theorizing to remain, if it is present at all, “deeply imbued” and 
perceived as having “crept into” IS research, but instead for systems theorizing to be 
conducted explicitly. This establishes the need to openly and ardently discuss the 
requirements for systems-theoretical research within IS and we would agree with Robey and 
Mikhaeil on the need to explore the reciprocal requirements that IS artifacts would impose on 
systems science (p.129).  
 
In a manner similar to the above, Mingers notes that “the current paper attempts this task for 
systems theory,” namely, the task of asking what implications does the approach of systems 
theory have for crafting theory, “but is too narrow and rather old-fashioned for it to 
successfully do justice to such a rich and vibrant field.” (p. 67) But from the perspective of 
information systems, has the field of systems theory indeed been rich and vibrant? 
 
As already noted, there has existed no overall body of literature indicating a general 
acceptance and broad application of systems theory in the information systems field. Apart 
from the few individual exceptions noted, the term “systems” in information systems has 
been an empty honorific, where the phrase “information systems” is largely interchangeable 
with “information technology” or even just “the computer.”   
 
3. The supposed overall neglect of systems science 
 
Another important reflection is given by Robey and Mikhaeil in their claim of “overall 
neglect of systems science.” While this might be taken as a parenthetical remark, we elect to 
address it in order to emphasize that systems science has reinvigorated other disciplines and 
showcase its potential toward that end. A recent example is systems biology that builds (in 
part) on early systemic principles (Ashby, 1958; Wiener, 1948; Wiener & Schadé, 1965); this 
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has led top academic institutions to embrace such programmes. Harvard Medical School for 
instance has a Department of Systems Biology with courses where dynamical systems theory 
is used as a tool to understand molecular and cellular biology. Oxford and Cambridge 
Universities (and many more), have similar programmes. Systems biology is defined as “the 
study of biological systems whose behaviour cannot be reduced to the linear sum of their 
parts’ functions” (Nature, 2017), an idea dismissed by Mingers as a “well-worn catch phrase” 
(more on that in section 5). Thus, to say that systems theory has been subject to overall 
neglect is not accurate. It is the field of IS that has neglected systems science. 
 
Figure 1: Google Analytics on Google scanned books corpus –  
The emergence of systems biology 
 
While a detailed bibliometric analysis would be warranted in order to support the statements 
about systems theory and information systems in full, we ran a query based on the Scopus 
database by keyword only (“systems theory” or “systems thinking”). Then, we filtered the 
results for journal articles that would belong to any of the journals of information 
management as these are listed in the latest Association of Business Schools (ABS) list. This 
includes the 72 journals on the ABS list (including the AIS senior scholars basket of eight).  
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Figure 2: “systems theory” or “systems thinking” journal article distribution based on subject 
area  (n=21335 documents) – 35 years span (percentages add up to more than 100% as some 
articles are tagged in multiple subject areas) 
 
 
Figure 3: IS-based journal articles on systems theory/systems thinking (n=111 documents) 
over a 25 year period – ABS list of journals 
Once again, we emphasize that due to multiple filters applied and several variations in 
bibliometric database structures, the above diagrams are only indicative; but in both 
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scenarios, we find that these indications to alert us to a simultaneous uptake of systems 
theory across disciplines but a lack of uptake in information systems.  
 
4. The communicability of systems theory and the path of grand theories 
Another interesting aspect that Robey and Mikhaeil reflect on is depicted in the following 
quotation (p. 128): 
… we find Demetis and Lee's claim that systems science could facilitate 
communication between academia and industry to be puzzling. Given the abstractness 
and complicatedness of both GST and Luhmann, they would seem to exist alongside 
of Giddens' structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) as examples of arcane academic 
language rather than appealing alternatives, as Demetis and Lee suggest. Checkland, 
2000, acknowledged by Demetis and Lee as an exemplary application of systems 
science, succeeds more as a methodology for analyzing socio-technical systems and 
less as a theory upon which research can be based. We have no argument with the 
value of Checkland's work and its impact on practice, but it would seem unfair to 
claim that Demetis and Lee's GST and LST principles, which lack lay terminology, 
would be easily understood by IS practitioners.  
 
On the issue of communication between academia and industry and the role of systems 
theory therein, we offer some additional thoughts in order to explain our assertion.  
 
Systems theory does not reside alongside Giddens’ structuration theory as suggested, either in 
complexity or in the degree of abstraction. The very fact that systems theoretical 
concepts/constructs have actually transcended law, sociology, economics, engineering, 
physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, etc., demonstrates the existence of a cross-
disciplinary language that can be adopted from one domain to another. If in turn we consider 
IS professionals, then – assuming these are people with university degrees – they would have 
studied in one of the many fields that has found some degree of semantic interoperability 
with systems theory. This has a complementary dimension: the set of systems requirements 
that we put forward have closer semantic correspondence to the issues that IS practitioners 
face (than structuration theory for instance). Systems concepts can be better understood by IS 
professionals as these concepts are native to the multidisciplinary pool of background 
disciplines that the IS professionals have studied. For example, when someone develops 
his/her background in computer science, or biology, or physics, or industrial engineering or 
anything else, they develop their thinking based on principles, structures, phenomena that 
they are taught. Whether they learn about a client-server architecture, or how a human cell 
uses its membrane to control the movement of substances in and out of the cell, or earth and 
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its moon, or indeed, a company and its business context, they can relate to what they could 
loosely identify as a system (e.g. a server, a single cell, earth, a company) and its environment 
(e.g. clients, other cells/structures in the human body, the moon, the business context).  
 
More critically, the systems-theoretical ideas that transcend different disciplines are the 
product of cross-discipline syntheses that have occurred over decades in the hope of 
delivering abstract/generalizable constructs and developing overarching systemic principles. 
We admit that there are some more difficult concepts within systems theory (like autopoiesis 
and self-reference), but we would be glad to pit the basic concepts of systems theory (like the 
difference between a system and its environment, boundary, and feedback) against the mental 
gymnastics of structuration. Also, we must not forget that while structuration has been 
developed by a sociologist, for sociology, and adopted by IS, the corpus of systems 
theoretical ideas (with its different branches) has been created in a bottom-to-top approach by 
a variety of disciplines. This is a radically different trajectory from other theories (like 
structuration) that have not been “designed” to accommodate cross-disciplinary 
communication; in that context, since the IS field attracts scholars from different 
backgrounds, we find the correspondence between IS and systems theory to be particularly 
attractive. Of course, it is up to IS researchers to explore how they can use our concepts (and 
those of others) to develop, as a second step, more detailed applicable/customisable 
methodologies at a similar level with Checkland's. These would enable a closer coupling 
between academia and industry. We contend that the same does not and cannot apply to 
theories like structuration – exactly because their degree of abstraction cannot facilitate such 
communication.  
 
We would agree with Robey and Mikhaeil that “Organization studies and IS have generally 
eschewed grand theory in favour of mid-range or grounded theorizing” as these are “deemed 
more practical and manageable” (Robey & Mikhaeil, 2016, p.128), but one may readily argue 
against a continuation of this approach. The inexorable trend towards mid-range theorizing 
for having manageable domain-specific descriptions has created a massive theoretical 
complexity which has in fact become unmanageable. It has created an asymmetry that 
becomes counter-productive. A good example is the technology acceptance model (TAM) for 
which Hovorka and Larsen (2017, p.5710) “estimate that thousands of extension papers have 
been published, most of which do not build upon or cite each other. This means that while the 
core concepts remain the same, each paper will add other constructs, and these constructs do 
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not retain a consistent set of names”; these TAM-extensions (estimated at approximately 
5,000 claimed “original contributions”) create a considerable demand toward theory 
integration as Hovorka and Larsen remind us. We would add that systems theory has already 
been through the process of construct-integration at a cross-disciplinary level; thus, despite 
some variations, there is consistency amongst its fundamental theoretical constructs. These 
have been developed in order to transcend fields and can therefore be reapplied to them, 
including in IS; furthermore, they can function as a theoretical vehicle for the reduction of 
such mid-range complexity, if adopted.  
 
5. On emergence, the observer, and other considerations  
 
One of the most critical concepts that are elevated within systems theory is the concept of 
emergence. In brief, the concept of emergence goes against reductionism and describes how 
new qualitative phenomena spring from the interconnection of different elements; such 
(emergent) phenomena cannot be attributed to their constituent parts. This is the spirit of the 
“whole being greater than the sum of its parts.” Mingers says that “Most of these concepts are 
discussed by Demetis and Lee (2016) except, interestingly, emergence” (p.68); however, we 
noted that “What we casually call an ‘information system’ is therefore, in this light, an 
emergent phenomenon.”  Interestingly, our essay offered the preceding statement to cap off a 
discussion of “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” which is paradoxically written 
off by Mingers as a well-worn catch phrase. This is exactly why we did not offer this phrase 
in isolation.  We noted: “Worth emphasizing are systems science’s three interrelated features 
that ‘the whole is more than the sum of the parts,’ ‘the parts are dynamically interrelated or 
interdependent,’ and ‘holistic properties not possible to detect by analysis should be possible 
to define in the system.’ ” In other words, the very idea that the “whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts” is the epitome of emergence. It is an expression that signifies a qualitative 
shift from the micro-level to the macro-level. It is also a recognition of something that cannot 
be attributed to the individual parts that interconnect and can be recognised to define a system 
as a whole (by an observer).  
 
A more elaborate point on the relationship between systems/environments is offered by 
Robey and Mikhaeil who discuss the following (p. 129):  
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While both GST and LST clearly delineate systems from their environments, and focus 
on the relationship between open systems and their environments, they hold fast to a 
traditional view of organizations (systems) that can be challenged. With the advent of 
technical platforms that transcend organizations, that belong to no one in particular, and 
are created and used by a diffuse set of actors, thinking about IS and organizations needs 
to be revised. GST poses that systems at all levels have the same characteristics (a multi-
level theory) (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), and it reinforces the idea that each 
level is distinct and self-contained. Neither GST nor Luhmann focus on relationships 
across levels (cross-level theory) (Rousseau, 1985). Winter et al. (2014) give us a new 
option by challenging the container view of organizations and offering an unbounded 
view of IS and its capacity to redefine what organizations are. 
 
While Luhmann’s impact on organization studies has been the subject of substantial 
discussion (Seidl & Becker, 2006, 2009), the distinct nature of systems, including any feature 
of self-containment, is not fixed but observer-relative. Nothing precludes the possibility of 
defining a system that includes multiple cross-level subsystems. We would agree with Robey 
and Mikhaeil that the advent of technical platforms transcends organizations but emphasize 
that Luhmann discusses that operative closure is coupled with the idea that systems remain 
informationally open. This is connected to a number of other concepts including 
interconnectedness but this is also based on systemic decomposition. For example, while the 
traditional view of systemic deconstruction perceives systems as a collection of sub-systems 
and sub-subsystems ad infinitum, Luhmann distinguishes between that view (we could call 
that the “classic” view of systems differentiation) and a view that perceives systems as a 
connection of elements and relations between these elements. The latter is a lot closer to a 
“networked” perspective and leads to the concept of system complexity. This opens the door 
for perceiving technology as a conduit of relationships “across levels” and in fact explores 
technology as a system in its own right (what Robey and Mikhaeil suggest as differentiated as 
a “technical system”). In another paper we have authored (Demetis & Lee, 2017), we lay part 
of these foundations by exploring the role-reversal between human agency and technology 
within the society/technology coupling; we argue that humans can now be considered as 
agents of a system of technology, moving the theoretical discussion closer to treating 
technology as a system.  
 
But there is another important consideration based on the distinction between 
system/environment. As Luhmann notes, “By defining a system, a conceptual boundary is 
unavoidably set; for without the boundary, the system would have been impossible to start 
with. Boundaries then cannot be conceived without something beyond and thus their very 
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existence presupposes the reality of a beyond and the possibility of transcendence” 
(Luhmann, 1995, p.43). So while the definition of a system “isolates” elements (based on an 
observer-relative perspective), it does not do the same for relations. Put differently, the 
boundary has the double function of both separating and connecting system/environment.  
 
 
6. Systems theory from the perspective of sociomateriality  
 
The reaction by Schultze (2017), rooted in sociomateriality, takes a different trajectory and 
provides a lengthy and substantive commentary that dives deep into the relationship between 
reality and theory. While the focus of Schultze’s commentary is built upon a relational 
ontology and differs in that it reflects on deeper assumptions about the relationship between 
reality and theory, there are a few aspects that Schultze emphasizes which we would like to 
address. In this context, we would like to offer some general comments that we feel are 
important specifically in the context of our essay and more generally in relation to what we 
had set out to do in the first place.  
 
Based on our reading, the main concerns of Schultze are succinctly summarised in the 
following quotation (Schultze, 2017, p.64):  
 
the reality that systems science seems to produce emerged as one dominated by static 
entities that are brought into orderly vertical (i.e. hierarchical decomposition) and 
horizontal (i.e. input-output) relationships with one another. Even though system 
science stresses interdependence and abstractions of complex wholes, these 
relationships are layered on top of the independent, static and agential 
components that make up a system.  
 
First, we would like to address the issue of independent components that make up a system, 
though this is to some degree related to the assertion that we posit static components. We 
would argue that the emphasis on interdependence is not just overlaid on top of independent 
components. Interconnections are weaved into the basic structure of the latest developments 
in systems theory. As Bechmann and Stehr (2002, p.70) remind us: “Luhmann proceeds from 
a system concept shaped in a strictly relational manner [emphasis added]. His notion relies 
on the idea of a constitutive boundary that permits the distinction between inside and outside. 
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Each operation of a system (in the case of social systems: each communication) (re)produces 
this boundary by embedding itself in a network of further operations, in which it at the same 
time gains its own unity/identity.” This concept of re-production, an essential basis for 
autopoietic, self-referential systems, portrays systems as dynamic entities that re-produce 
themselves in a dynamic manner through the network of complex interrelationships that bind 
them together.  
While for analytical purposes we may choose one configuration of elements/relations over 
another (e.g. in our Anti-Money Laundering case), these essentially represent the choice of an 
observer and prompt both second order observations and re-observations from other 
perspectives. The primacy of the observer as a distinction-creating entity must not be 
forgotten in this context as “whenever an observer observes, he creates a contingent 
distinction between what is observed and what is by necessity left unobserved. The 
complexity of the real world that is observed rests upon this stratum of such contingent 
distinctions” (Angell & Demetis, 2010, p.174).  
A good example of this is given by Luhmann in his book The Reality of the Mass Media 
which reminds us that any distinction can be subjected to different deconstructions by 
different observers (Luhmann, 2000). For example, the distinction between true/false has a 
different use-value when it is examined, used and interpreted from the perspective of the 
system of science than what it has when viewed from the system of theology or the system of 
law. This implies that the use-value of any distinction that is to be deconstructed is contingent 
upon the observers that attempt this act of deconstruction. This not only grants primacy to the 
role of the observer within LST but also implies that distinctions are contingent on the 
observing system that identifies them. This then opens the door for observers of observers 
(second order observers). An example related to Anti-Money Laundering can help us 
illustrate this further. For instance, terrorist organisations are part of the AML compliance 
regime as terrorists are dependent on both legal and illegal money in order to fund their 
terrorist operations. But different institutions (e.g. banks, political organisations, NGOs) 
approach the monitoring of terrorist financing differently. In this case, we could say that the 
distinction between terrorists/non-terrorists is a single distinction that can have multiple 
observers. This is a difference that can be subjected to a further difference however – the 
French term différance is reserved for this condition (Luhmann borrows this term from 
Jacques Derrida). This implies that the meaning captured in the unity of the distinction 
between terrorists/non-terrorists can be deferred not only to first order observers (e.g. the 
banks, political organisations, NGOs) but also to second order observers. It is only by 
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observing the observation of first order observers (i.e. conducting a second order observation) 
that we can deconstruct the observations of the first order observers.  
 
Of course, second order observers “construct” distinctions too: they observe with cognitive 
and other biases that colour the deconstruction of first order observers. But second order 
observers serve a unique function (and role) in delineating the conditions and the differences 
that the exact same distinction (i.e. terrorists/non-terrorists) may be approached by the first 
order observers. They point to the contingency that first order observers 
observe/designate/identify a “different object.” As Luhmann mentions, “the illusion to be 
deconstructed is the assumption that all these systems designate the same object when they 
use a distinction” (Luhmann, 2002). In fact, the stereotypicality of any such distinction (e.g. 
terrorist/non-terrorist) makes it difficult to recognise the different layers of observer-
contingent differences that are at play. In a sense, it is no surprise that Luhmann chose mass 
media as a fruitful application domain to highlight how first order observers are bombarded 
with stereotypical distinctions and how second order observing could unpick the different 
contingencies assumed and subsumed in the portrayal of such distinctions. Put differently, it 
is only when one introduces a second order observer that a multiplicity of first order 
observers can come into focus (e.g. and ultimately the distinctions that they use to observe an 
object). Deconstructing any problem domain then becomes an exercise in second-order 
observing. This pits relationality in systems theory against a grid of observing systems that 
can be re-observed. A good reading that highlights some of these aspects is the book chapter, 
“Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing” (Luhmann, 2002, pp.94-112).  
 
We would supplement this with Gregersen’s quotation (in a theological research context 
where systems theory has also been applied) that: “this turn from a substantialist ontology 
toward a relational ontology marks a paradigm shift in systems theory as well as in theology” 
(Gregersen, 1998). Thus, when Schultze states that “a relational ontology regards reality in 
‘dynamic, continuous and processual terms’ rather than in substantialist (or essentialist) ones 
(Emirbayer, 1997),”  we too would argue for the former (the relational) but note that systems 
theory’s explicit observer-relative emphasis, coupled with its stream of second order 
observation, makes a lucid rendition of relationality: one built upon the distinctions and 
differences of different observers.    
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Overall, the conclusions that Schultze draws can be described as overgeneralizing from the 
one case we offered as merely being illustrative.  Might there be other cases which formulate 
systems theory in ways compatible with sociomateriality?  This is an open question. Schultze 
notes, “In summary, the world that systems science seems to be producing is one of things 
whose identities and boundaries are quite stable.” (p.63). As analysed above, one could 
readily offer a different formulation of systems theory, including Luhmannian systems 
theory, of things whose identities and boundaries are not quite stable.  Again, the main point 
is to consider the formulation of systems theory in the Demetis and Lee essay as but a single 
case that should not be overgeneralized as offering universal criteria for what constitutes 
systems science.  
 
On another important matter, Schultze makes the point, “a key consequence of this 
perspective is that we can shape reality through the theories and methods we adopt,” and 
raises the question, “What kind of reality does systems science produce?” (p.60) We 
recognize this as an empirical question.  Schultze dwells on some of the details from the 
Drosia bank case, but there are in fact numerous other examples of reality produced by 
systems science.  For this, we can turn to the many examples available from the field work of 
Checkland’s soft systems methodology or SSM (for an introduction to examples of SSM field 
work, see (Checkland & Poulter, 2006)), which itself is a form of action research.  If we were 
to ask: “Has SSM been applied to shape realities in ways that can be considered beneficial?”, 
certainly proponents of SSM would answer yes.  This should alleviate concerns that Schultze 
has about the high stakes of advocating and adopting the lens of systems theorizing.  Of 
course, the kind or kinds of reality produced by SSM might or might not conform to the kind 
of reality approved by proponents of sociomateriality, but then, neither SSM in particular nor 
systems science in general has purported to be consistent with the principles of 
sociomateriality.  In fact, as an intellectual exercise, one might even turn the tables: to what 
extent may we judge sociomateriality as living up to the principles of systems 
science?  Perhaps the lesson is that neither should be privileged over the other. 
 
Finally, we must draw attention to Schultze’s misunderstanding that, in our essay, “six 
requirements that need to be satisfied for an IS study to qualify as systems science, are 
developed and empirically demonstrated.”  As mentioned previously, we emphasized in 
different parts of our essay that our set of requirements is not a “universal set of systems 
criteria but just one possible set out of many” (p.126) and that “the purpose is not to present 
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all features of systems science” (p.116). We caution that our call for greater systems 
theorizing, which we merely illustrate with principles from GST and LST, should not be 
reified into a recipe. 
 
 
*               *               * 
The commentaries of Robey and Mikhaeil, of Mingers, and of Schultze are all useful for 
indicating the range of reactions to the systems theorizing we advocate for IS research.  
Where the reaction is that it crept into IS research where it remains deeply imbued, we 
prescribe that it move into a role where it is conducted explicitly. Where the reaction is that it 
is old fashioned, we recommend patience so that it may advance one step at a time. Where 
the reaction is that it does not necessarily help to make a kind of world that is desirable, we 
emphasize that there are many forms of systems theorizing, and the kinds of worlds that they 
make are likely to span a wide range. 
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